KeePass 1 AES (without keyfile) Hash

What is KeePass 1 AES (without keyfile)?

The **KeePass 1 AES (without keyfile)** hash format is a legacy cryptographic scheme introduced in the early iterations of the KeePass password manager (pre-KeePassXC/KeePass 2.x), designed to secure database encryption using the AES block cipher in CBC mode with PKCS#7 padding. Originating from a need for lightweight, portable password storage, this format encodes the master password (or key) through a custom iteration-based key derivation process—specifically, a proprietary "KeePass hash" function that combines SHA-1 with a fixed number of iterations (typically 1,000 by default, though configurable). The structure consists of a 32-byte (256-bit) AES key derived from the master password via this process, which is then used to encrypt the KeePass database file (`.kdb`) in CBC mode with a 16-byte IV (stored at the start of the file). Unlike modern iterations of KeePass, this format lacks a salt or pepper mechanism, relying solely on the password itself for key derivation, and does not support hardware-based key derivation functions (HKDF) or adaptive iteration counts. Its primary use-case was to provide a balance between security and compatibility in early versions of the tool, though it was superseded by more robust formats like AES-256 with HMAC-SHA256 in KeePass 2.x.

The **KeePass 1 AES format is highly vulnerable to cracking due to its outdated cryptographic design and computational inefficiencies**. The absence of a salt means attackers can precompute or reuse hash values for identical passwords across multiple databases, enabling dictionary attacks and rainbow table exploitation. The fixed iteration count (often as low as 1,000) renders the key derivation process computationally trivial for modern hardware, allowing brute-force attacks to achieve high hash rates via optimized GPU/FPGA implementations (e.g., using tools like Hashcat’s `kp1` attack mode). Additionally, SHA-1’s known collision vulnerabilities and its use in a non-iterated or poorly iterated key derivation function further weaken the scheme, as the effective key space is effectively reduced to ~160 bits of security. The CBC mode’s susceptibility to padding oracle attacks (if implemented naively) and the lack of integrity checks (e.g., HMAC) also expose the encrypted data to chosen-plaintext attacks. Finally, the format’s reliance on a single, non-peppered password-derived key eliminates the ability to mitigate against side-channel attacks or adaptive workloads, making it unsuitable for modern security standards.

Identifying KeePass 1 AES (without keyfile) Hashes

Identifying a hash blindly is often difficult because multiple algorithms can output strings of the exact same length. For example, a standard 32-character hexadecimal string could be MD5, NTLM, MD4, or LM. To definitively identify KeePass 1 AES (without keyfile), security researchers analyze the hash against a strict regular expression (regex) signature (shown above) to find structural matches.

How to Crack KeePass 1 AES (without keyfile)

If you need to recover the plaintext password for a KeePass 1 AES (without keyfile) hash during a penetration test or forensics investigation, you must supply the correct module ID to your cracking software. Use the exact commands provided at the top of this page to target the hash successfully.