MSSQL(2012) Hash

What is MSSQL(2012)?

The **MSSQL(2012) hash format** originates from Microsoft SQL Server 2012’s implementation of password storage, designed to replace the older MD5-based hashing mechanism introduced in SQL Server 2008. Structurally, it combines a **SHA-1-based hash** with a **salted password verification scheme**, though the salt is not cryptographically secure by modern standards. The format stores passwords as a **128-bit (16-byte) SHA-1 hash** of the concatenated salt and password, followed by a **32-bit (4-byte) version identifier** (0x00000001 for SQL Server 2012) and a **32-bit (4-byte) salt length** (typically 8 bytes). The salt itself is a fixed-length (8-byte) value derived from the user’s SID and a system-generated component, but it is not unique per user or dynamically generated per password attempt. This format was intended to mitigate rainbow table attacks by requiring storage of salted hashes, but its reliance on SHA-1 and predictable salt generation introduced critical security flaws. The primary use-case was securing SQL Server authentication credentials, though it was deprecated in favor of stronger algorithms (e.g., SHA-256 with per-user salts) in later versions.

The **MSSQL(2012) hash format is vulnerable to cracking due to several inherent weaknesses**. First, its reliance on **SHA-1** renders it susceptible to **collision attacks** and **precomputed rainbow tables**, as SHA-1 is now considered cryptographically broken for password storage. Second, the **predictable salt structure**—derived from the user’s SID and a static system component—allows attackers to precompute hashes for common salts, enabling **offline brute-force attacks** with reduced computational overhead. Third, the **lack of a per-password salt** means identical passwords across users produce identical hashes (after salt application), enabling **credential reuse attacks** and bulk hash cracking. Finally, the format’s design facilitates **GPU/ASIC acceleration** for brute-force attacks, as the fixed-length operations and lack of cryptographic salt randomization optimize for parallel cracking tools like **Hashcat** or **John the Ripper**. These flaws collectively render MSSQL(2012) hashes trivially crackable with modern hardware and optimized dictionary attacks.

Identifying MSSQL(2012) Hashes

Identifying a hash blindly is often difficult because multiple algorithms can output strings of the exact same length. For example, a standard 32-character hexadecimal string could be MD5, NTLM, MD4, or LM. To definitively identify MSSQL(2012), security researchers analyze the hash against a strict regular expression (regex) signature (shown above) to find structural matches.

How to Crack MSSQL(2012)

If you need to recover the plaintext password for a MSSQL(2012) hash during a penetration test or forensics investigation, you must supply the correct module ID to your cracking software. Use the exact commands provided at the top of this page to target the hash successfully.