NetNTLMv2 Hash

Technical details, regex signatures, and cracking commands for the NetNTLMv2 algorithm.

Regex Identification Signature:
^([^\\\/:*?"<>|]{1,20}\\)?[^\\\/:*?"<>|]{1,20}[:]{2,3}([^\\\/:*?"<>|]{1,20}:)?[^\\\/:*?"<>|]{1,20}:[a-f0-9]{32}:[a-f0-9]+$
Hashcat Command (Mode: 5600):
John the Ripper Command:
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What is NetNTLMv2?

NetNTLMv2 is a cryptographic hash format introduced by Microsoft as part of its authentication framework to replace the earlier, more vulnerable NTLMv1 protocol. Originating in the late 1990s as an evolution of the New Technology LAN Manager (NTLM) challenge-response mechanism, it was designed to enhance security over its predecessor by incorporating a more robust handshake process and message integrity checks. Structurally, NetNTLMv2 operates as a challenge-response authentication protocol where the client and server exchange hashed messages to verify identity without transmitting plaintext credentials. The format consists of a multi-stage process: the server sends a random challenge, the client combines this with the user’s hashed password (stored as a reversible DES-based hash in Windows) and a session key, then hashes the result using MD4 (for the initial response) followed by a second MD4 hash of the concatenated challenge, client nonce, server nonce, and session key. This produces a 128-bit response, which the server verifies against its own computation. Primarily used in legacy Windows authentication (e.g., SMB, HTTP Basic Auth), NetNTLMv2 remains prevalent in internal corporate networks due to its deep integration with Microsoft ecosystems, though it is deprecated in favor of modern protocols like Kerberos or NTLMv2 Session Security.

The vulnerability of NetNTLMv2 stems from its reliance on predictable inputs, lack of salting, and susceptibility to offline cracking. Unlike modern hashes, NetNTLMv2 does not employ a per-user salt, making it vulnerable to rainbow table attacks if password hashes are exposed. The protocol’s reliance on MD4—known for its poor collision resistance and susceptibility to length-extension attacks—further weakens its security. Offline attackers can leverage GPU-accelerated tools like Hashcat or John the Ripper to brute-force or precompute hashes, as the 128-bit response space is computationally tractable with modern hardware. Additionally, the reversible nature of the initial DES-based password hash (LM hash) in Windows allows attackers to derive plaintext passwords from captured hashes, bypassing the need to crack the NetNTLMv2 response entirely. Optimizations like parallelized MD4 hashing on GPUs and the absence of rate-limiting mechanisms exacerbate the risk, enabling rapid enumeration of credentials in large-scale attacks.

Identifying NetNTLMv2 Hashes

Identifying a hash blindly is often difficult because multiple algorithms can output strings of the exact same length. For example, a standard 32-character hexadecimal string could be MD5, NTLM, MD4, or LM. To definitively identify NetNTLMv2, security researchers analyze the hash against a strict regular expression (regex) signature (shown above) to find structural matches.

How to Crack NetNTLMv2

If you need to recover the plaintext password for a NetNTLMv2 hash during a penetration test or forensics investigation, you must supply the correct module ID to your cracking software. Use the exact commands provided at the top of this page to target the hash successfully.