osCommerce Hash

Technical details, regex signatures, and cracking commands for the osCommerce algorithm.

Regex Identification Signature:
^[a-f0-9]{32}:[a-z0-9]{2}$
Hashcat Command (Mode: 21):
Not supported natively by John the Ripper
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What is osCommerce?

The **osCommerce hash format** originates from the legacy **osCommerce** e-commerce platform (originally released in 2002), which employed a custom password hashing scheme to secure user credentials. Structurally, this format is a **non-standardized, low-entropy hash** typically represented as a **32-character hexadecimal string** (e.g., `5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99`), derived from a **MD5-based** (or occasionally SHA-1) hash of the plaintext password concatenated with a **static salt** (e.g., the username or a hardcoded string). Unlike modern cryptographic hashes, osCommerce’s implementation lacks proper salting mechanisms (beyond trivial concatenation) and relies on a **single fixed iteration count** (often just one pass), making it susceptible to offline brute-force attacks. Its primary use-case was securing password storage in early PHP/MySQL-based e-commerce systems, though it was never intended for security-critical applications and is now considered **deprecated** due to its inherent vulnerabilities.

The osCommerce hash format is vulnerable to cracking primarily due to its **predictable structure, lack of salting, and computational inefficiency**. The absence of **per-password salts** (only trivial concatenation) allows attackers to precompute hashes via **rainbow tables** or **dictionary attacks** when usernames are exposed. Additionally, its reliance on **MD5/SHA-1**—both now cryptographically broken—means collisions are trivial to exploit, and **GPU/ASIC acceleration** (e.g., via tools like **Hashcat**) can brute-force hashes at speeds exceeding **millions of attempts per second**. The **single-pass hashing** further exacerbates this, as modern password hashing schemes (e.g., bcrypt, Argon2) incorporate **work factors** to resist automated cracking. Finally, the **static salt** (if present) is often weak or derived from user input, rendering it ineffective against targeted attacks. These flaws render osCommerce’s hash format **completely insecure** for contemporary security standards.

Identifying osCommerce Hashes

Identifying a hash blindly is often difficult because multiple algorithms can output strings of the exact same length. For example, a standard 32-character hexadecimal string could be MD5, NTLM, MD4, or LM. To definitively identify osCommerce, security researchers analyze the hash against a strict regular expression (regex) signature (shown above) to find structural matches.

How to Crack osCommerce

If you need to recover the plaintext password for a osCommerce hash during a penetration test or forensics investigation, you must supply the correct module ID to your cracking software. Use the exact commands provided at the top of this page to target the hash successfully.