PBKDF2(Atlassian) Hash

Technical details, regex signatures, and cracking commands for the PBKDF2(Atlassian) algorithm.

Regex Identification Signature:
^\{PKCS5S2\}[a-z0-9\/+]{64}$
Not supported natively by Hashcat
Not supported natively by John the Ripper
← Back to Hash Identifier

What is PBKDF2(Atlassian)?

PBKDF2(Atlassian) is a variant of the Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) algorithm, specifically tailored for use in Atlassian’s proprietary authentication systems, including products like Confluence and Jira. Structurally, it adheres to the broader PBKDF2 framework—iteratively hashing a password with a pseudorandom function (typically HMAC-SHA1) to produce a derived key—but incorporates a non-standardized tweak: the use of a fixed, non-unique salt (the string `"atlassian"` or similar hardcoded values) combined with a relatively modest iteration count (often as low as 1,000 iterations). This variant was designed for legacy compatibility and ease of implementation within Atlassian’s early authentication infrastructure, prioritizing simplicity over cryptographic robustness. Its primary use-case was password storage in older versions of Atlassian’s software, where the focus was on functionality rather than resistance to brute-force attacks, reflecting the security practices of the mid-2000s.

The vulnerability of PBKDF2(Atlassian) stems from its design flaws, particularly the absence of per-password salting and an insufficient iteration count. The fixed salt renders it susceptible to rainbow table attacks, as identical hashes can be precomputed for all possible passwords. Additionally, the low iteration count (e.g., 1,000) makes it computationally trivial to crack using modern hardware, including GPU-accelerated brute-force tools like Hashcat. The lack of adaptive iteration counts or key stretching further exacerbates this, as modern attackers can evaluate millions of passwords per second. Even if the salt were unique, the reliance on HMAC-SHA1—now considered cryptographically weak—introduces collision vulnerabilities and reduces the effective entropy of the derived keys. These weaknesses collectively render PBKDF2(Atlassian) obsolete by contemporary standards, making it highly vulnerable to offline dictionary and brute-force attacks.

Identifying PBKDF2(Atlassian) Hashes

Identifying a hash blindly is often difficult because multiple algorithms can output strings of the exact same length. For example, a standard 32-character hexadecimal string could be MD5, NTLM, MD4, or LM. To definitively identify PBKDF2(Atlassian), security researchers analyze the hash against a strict regular expression (regex) signature (shown above) to find structural matches.

How to Crack PBKDF2(Atlassian)

If you need to recover the plaintext password for a PBKDF2(Atlassian) hash during a penetration test or forensics investigation, you must supply the correct module ID to your cracking software. Use the exact commands provided at the top of this page to target the hash successfully.