PBKDF2-SHA256(Generic) Hash

Technical details, regex signatures, and cracking commands for the PBKDF2-SHA256(Generic) algorithm.

Regex Identification Signature:
^\$pbkdf2-sha256\$[0-9]+\$[a-z0-9\/.]+\$[a-z0-9\/.]{43}$
Hashcat Command (Mode: 20300):
John the Ripper Command:
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What is PBKDF2-SHA256(Generic)?

PBKDF2-SHA256(Generic) is a key derivation function (KDF) derived from the Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) standard (RFC 8018), designed to iteratively hash a password with a cryptographic hash function—SHA-256 in this case—to produce a derived key of specified length. Its origins trace back to the broader need for secure password storage in systems where plaintext credentials cannot be stored due to security risks. The algorithm’s structure consists of three core components: a password (P), a salt (S), an iteration count (c), and a derived key length (dkl). The process involves concatenating the salt with the password, hashing the result with SHA-256, and applying HMAC-SHA256 iteratively (c times) to produce a pseudo-random key. This method mitigates trivial attacks by introducing computational overhead and salt entropy, making it suitable for applications requiring defense against brute-force and rainbow table attacks, such as password hashing in authentication systems.

Despite its security improvements over simpler hashing schemes, PBKDF2-SHA256(Generic) remains vulnerable to cracking due to several architectural limitations. The primary weakness lies in its reliance on iteration counts that, while intended to slow down attacks, are often insufficiently high in practice, allowing modern hardware (e.g., GPUs or FPGAs) to perform brute-force or dictionary attacks at accelerated speeds. Additionally, the absence of a sufficiently long or randomly generated salt in some implementations reduces entropy, enabling attackers to precompute or reuse hashes (e.g., via rainbow tables). Furthermore, the fixed iteration count (if too low) fails to adapt to advancements in computational power, rendering the function vulnerable to timing attacks or optimized parallel cracking tools like Hashcat or John the Ripper. Finally, the generic nature of PBKDF2’s design—without built-in resistance to side-channel attacks or adaptive iteration scaling—makes it susceptible to hardware-accelerated decryption, particularly when deployed without additional safeguards like key stretching or hardware security modules.

Identifying PBKDF2-SHA256(Generic) Hashes

Identifying a hash blindly is often difficult because multiple algorithms can output strings of the exact same length. For example, a standard 32-character hexadecimal string could be MD5, NTLM, MD4, or LM. To definitively identify PBKDF2-SHA256(Generic), security researchers analyze the hash against a strict regular expression (regex) signature (shown above) to find structural matches.

How to Crack PBKDF2-SHA256(Generic)

If you need to recover the plaintext password for a PBKDF2-SHA256(Generic) hash during a penetration test or forensics investigation, you must supply the correct module ID to your cracking software. Use the exact commands provided at the top of this page to target the hash successfully.